The Custer and Sitting Bull Debate, Shadows Over the Greasy Grass River

Accompanied by Captain George Yates, Captain Thomas Custer, and Lieutenant James Calhoun, Custer turned to the right and led his battalion up the steep bluffs overlooking the Little Bighorn Valley. The maneuver appears to have been intended to position his command for an attack on the village from a different direction while Reno’s battalion advanced from the valley below. By operating on separate axes, Custer may have hoped to catch the village between converging forces and prevent a large-scale escape.

Far beneath them in the river bottom, Major Marcus Reno formed his battalion for an advance down the valley floor toward the immense Lakota and Cheyenne village. Although hidden by the bends of the Little Bighorn River and the cottonwood-lined valley, the village extended for miles along the river and contained far more warriors than Custer had been informed about by military intelligence and anticipated. As Reno moved forward below and Custer’s battalion climbed the heights above, the Seventh Cavalry was beginning a series of movements that would soon separate its battalions and shape the course of one of the most famous battles in American history.

Italian Private Martin spoke broken English and carried specific orders from Custer, written by Regimental Adjutant First Lieutenant Cooke, to Captain Benteen to “Come quick” and “bring packs” meaning ammunition packs as a big fight was evident.

Custer left his battalion in Cedar Coulee and, accompanied by Captain Thomas Custer, First Lieutenant William W. Cooke, the regimental adjutant and brevet lieutenant colonel from the Civil War, and scout Mitch Bouyer, rode to the crest of Sharpshooter Ridge. Just below them waited Trumpeter John Martin, who served as both a bugler and messenger. From the ridge, the officers and scouts paused to study the valley below. Through gaps in the tall cottonwood trees lining the Little Bighorn River, portions of the sprawling Lakota and Cheyenne village began to come into view. What had previously been hidden by the winding river and dense vegetation was now becoming apparent: the village was immense, stretching for miles along the valley floor and containing far more lodges than anyone in the Seventh Cavalry had anticipated. Standing atop the ridge, Custer and his companions were among the first soldiers to appreciate the true size of the encampment they had come to attack.

Although soldiers in the valley later reported seeing Custer on Weir Point, the evidence suggests that he never rode to that location. Trumpeter and courier John Martin, one of the last men to see Custer alive, placed him instead on a nearby prominence now known as Sharpshooter Ridge. Viewed from the valley floor, the elevated ridgeline could easily have created the impression that Custer was standing on Weir Point. Meanwhile, the rest of his battalion remained concealed within Cedar Coulee, hidden from view by the broken terrain. As a result, observers below likely mistook Custer’s actual position as on Weir Point and were unable to see the majority of the cavalry column.

As Custer and two battalions turned down Medicine Tail Coulee, Custer may have seen a small group of warriors on top of Luce Ridge. He ordered Captain Keogh to take his battalion and engage them.

entered the area, eagerly sought an opportunity to prove their courage and demonstrate their worth as future warriors. Defying the village guards whose task was to keep noncombatants and inexperienced youths away from danger, a small group slipped past them and made its way into the hills north of the Little Bighorn River. There they watched events unfold with growing excitement. When the sound of gunfire suddenly echoed across the ridges from the fighting near Luce Ridge, the boys could no longer contain themselves. Mounting their ponies, they raced toward the action, determined to witness the battle firsthand and, if possible, earn honors of their own.

Before long, they encountered Captain Myles Keogh’s battalion as it moved from the Luce Ridge area toward Nye-Cartwright Ridge. At the first sign of the young riders, Keogh deployed a mounted skirmish line and a brief exchange of gunfire followed. As the cavalry continued along the ridge, he later dismounted portions of his command and formed a skirmish line on foot to screen Custer’s advance. The young Lakotas kept their distance, watching the action unfold while avoiding a close engagement. Their primary interest appears to have been observing the soldiers and testing their own courage rather than engaging in a serious fight. The encounter was brief, and there is no evidence that either side suffered casualties during these preliminary exchanges. As word of the soldiers’ approach spread through the village, however, these seemingly minor skirmishes helped alert increasing numbers of warriors to the developing threat.

Afterward, Keogh led his battalion off the ridge and descended into Deep Coulee, where his command rejoined Custer and Yates at what has become known as Reunion Point, just south of Calhoun Hill. There, the separated elements of Custer’s battalion once again came together as the situation along the Little Bighorn became increasingly urgent. The movement represented another stage in the concentration of Custer’s forces and placed Keogh’s men in position for the fierce fighting that would soon erupt along and below Battle Ridge. From Reunion Point, the battalion’s attention shifted from reconnaissance and screening operations to the growing threat posed by warriors converging from the village, setting the stage for the final engagements of the battle.

Crow scouts Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin had already requested and received permission to leave the column. Experienced plainsmen and veteran warriors, they recognized the immense size of Sitting Bull’s village and understood that the number of warriors present far exceeded anything the soldiers anticipated. From their vantage points along the bluffs, they could see that the encampment stretched for miles along the Little Bighorn Valley.

Convinced that a major battle was imminent, the scouts grew increasingly concerned about the fate of Custer’s command. They feared that the Seventh Cavalry was riding into a situation far more dangerous than its officers realized. Unwilling to be caught in what they believed could become a disaster, they remained only briefly to observe developments near Reno Hill before departing. As they left, they carried with them a growing sense that the soldiers were about to face overwhelming odds.

Curly, the youngest and least experienced of the Crow scouts, made a different choice. Rather than departing with the others, he remained with the command and continued north with Custer’s battalion alongside scout Mitch Bouyer. Although less experienced than Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin, Curly chose to stay even though the situation around the village grew increasingly dangerous.

In the hours that followed, he would become the last Crow scout associated with Custer’s command. After the battle, Curly emerged as one of the best-known Native participants connected to the Little Bighorn campaign. His survival, combined with his association with Custer during the battalion’s final movements, made him a figure of enduring interest to historians seeking to reconstruct the events leading to the destruction of Custer’s command.

Custer could see women and children fleeing toward the distant bluffs across the valley and downstream beyond the Northern Cheyenne village and the Single Warrior camp near Ford C. Some families had already struck their tipis and were loading poles, covers, and personal belongings onto pony-drawn travois in preparation for departure. Others remained uncertain, hurriedly gathering possessions while trying to decide whether to stay or flee.

The scene confirmed what the scouts had been reporting throughout the campaign: the village was far larger than army intelligence had indicated. Instead of a few hundred lodges, Custer was confronted by an immense encampment stretching for miles along the Little Bighorn River. The village may have contained approximately 10,000 people and perhaps 3,000 to 3,500 potential warriors, a figure that included older boys capable of joining the fight if circumstances required. What appeared at first to be an opportunity to trap a fleeing village was, in reality, a confrontation with one of the largest concentrations of Lakota and Cheyenne ever assembled on the Northern Plains.

From his vantage point near Ford B, however, much of the danger remained concealed. The great majority of warriors had already ridden south toward Reno’s attack in the timber, leaving this section of the village looking more vulnerable than it actually was. While Custer observed noncombatants fleeing and camps in various stages of dismantlement, hundreds of warriors were already turning back toward the north, a movement that would soon transform the battlefield and place his battalion in grave peril.

The realization presented both danger and opportunity. The village was far too large for Custer’s battalion to control on its own unless General Terry or General Crook arrived quickly with additional forces. Yet Custer’s mission had not changed. His objective remained to prevent the village’s inhabitants from scattering and escaping before the Army could bring them to battle.

From his vantage point overlooking the valley, he could already see signs that the opportunity was slipping away. A growing stream of women, children, and pony herds was moving downriver, while travois loaded with household goods rolled toward the distant bluffs. Each passing minute increased the likelihood that large portions of the village would escape beyond his reach.

To Custer, the situation may have appeared to demand immediate action. Although the size of the encampment was alarming, the portion of the village visible from Ford B seemed only lightly defended. Many of the warriors had ridden south to confront Reno’s attack, leaving relatively few armed men in sight. The combination of a vulnerable-looking village and the increasing movement of noncombatants may have convinced Custer that delay would only allow the enemy to disperse. If he hoped to block the non-combatants escape routes and hold the village in place until additional forces arrived, the time to act appeared to be now.

A direct crossing at Ford B with Yates’s battalion offered little advantage. Such an attack would likely have scattered the women, children, and pony herds in every direction, allowing many of them to escape. Rather than trapping the noncombatants, the crossing risked accelerating their flight and making it impossible for the Army to control their movements.

At the same time, Custer would have exposed his rear and flanks to counterattacks from Lakota and Northern Cheyenne warriors once they became aware of his presence. Any success achieved at the ford could quickly be offset by the arrival of large numbers of warriors converging from other parts of the battlefield. The terrain also offered limited room for maneuver and could leave his command vulnerable along the riverbank.

Viewed from Custer’s perspective, the crossing did not appear to offer a favorable tactical solution. A movement farther north, however, held the possibility of intercepting the fleeing noncombatants while maintaining the high ground and avoiding a potentially costly fight in the village itself. Whether this was his reasoning cannot be known with certainty, but his subsequent movements suggest that he rejected an immediate assault at Ford B and instead continued northward in search of a more advantageous position from which to accomplish his mission.

Instead, Custer appears to have withdrawn up Deep Coulee and reunited with Keogh’s battalion. From there, he may have intended to consolidate his scattered forces before making his next move. One possibility is that Custer planned to leave Keogh in a blocking position along the ridges overlooking the village, using his battalion to delay or disrupt warriors returning from the fighting against Reno.

Such a deployment would have bought valuable time while Custer waited for Captain Benteen and the ammunition pack train to arrive. Additional ammunition and the reinforcement of Benteen’s battalion would have strengthened the Seventh Cavalry’s ability to hold the high ground and respond to developments around the village.

At the same time, Reno’s battalion was still heavily engaged farther south. Custer may have hoped that Reno’s attack would continue to occupy a substantial portion of the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne warriors, preventing them from concentrating against a single battalion. If so, the plan depended on time and coordination. The longer Reno held the warriors’ attention and the sooner Benteen arrived, the better Custer’s prospects for containing the village and preventing a mass escape.

Events, however, were moving rapidly. Reno’s withdrawal from the timber and retreat to the bluffs freed thousands of warriors to shift their attention elsewhere. As those warriors began returning northward toward Custer’s position, the tactical situation changed dramatically, reducing the margin for error and increasing the danger facing the battalion on the ridges above the Little Bighorn.

Custer’s next move appears to have been an effort to conceal his advance behind the high ground of Battle Ridge and maneuver northward beyond the village. By using the ridges and coulees to screen his movements, he could approach without immediately revealing the full extent of his force to the inhabitants below.

If this interpretation is correct, Custer may have intended to move Yates’ E and F Companies into a position behind the stream of fleeing noncombatants. By placing soldiers below the retreating women, children, and pony herds, he could potentially cut off their escape routes and seize a substantial number of family members as hostages.

Such a strategy would not have been unusual in frontier warfare. Army operations often sought to secure villages, pony herds, and noncombatants as a means of compelling hostile warriors to cease resistance and negotiate. Custer may have believed that control of a large number of women and children would provide leverage over the warriors and help prevent the village from dispersing before other Army columns could arrive.

The plan, however, depended on speed and surprise. If the battalion could reach a blocking position before large numbers of warriors returned from the fighting against Reno, Custer might be able to establish a strong hold on the escape routes north of the village. If the warriors returned first, the situation would be reversed, leaving Custer’s relatively small battalion exposed on unfamiliar ground and increasingly vulnerable to attack from multiple directions.