Entering the abandoned village was a remarkable experience. The vast number of belongings left behind testified to the speed of the departure. Yet the exodus was not prompted by fear of the approaching Terry Column. Instead, the chiefs understood that the great victory over Custer would inevitably bring a powerful military response. By dispersing into smaller tribal bands, they denied the Army a single target upon which to focus its retaliation.
General Sherman declared in reviewing the findings of a Court of Inquiry on a Civil War battle:
It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commander of an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conduct for managing his command. He is responsible for results and holds the lives and reputations of every officer and soldier under his orders as subordinate to the great end–victory. The most important events are usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he [the commander] cannot stop to analyze his reasons. He must act on the impulse, the conviction, of the instant, and should be sustained in his conclusions, if not manifestly unjust. The power to command men, and give vehement impulse to their joint action, is something which cannot be defined by words, but it is plain and manifest in battles, and whoever commands an army in chief must choose his subordinates by reason of qualities which can alone be tested in actual conflict.
General Terry received a letter by carrier from General Sheridan. He was worried that considerable numbers of reservation warriors had gone out to join the hostiles for the summer. He wanted to warn Terry that he had information that at least 5,000 warriors were being assembled in the campaign area and cautioned Terry not to split his command. General Crook was coming up from the south to reinforce him. Of course, there was no coordination in this so-called “three-pronged attack.”
Department commanders General Terry, General Crook, and Colonel Gibbon, leading the Montana Column, had complete freedom to act independently of each other. Gibbon squandered an opportunity to attack a much smaller village that was, at one point, only about 18 miles away from his encampment. Later, Terry put Gibbon under his command, but that did little to improve a weak attack plan.
Later, General Nelson Miles wrote, “the real definition of ‘Custer’s luck’ was the judgment to do the right thing at the right time: being on the scene was certainly a prerequisite, but in and of itself did not guarantee results.”1706 No, it did not. Instead, you had to have a commander that was experienced, brilliant in exploiting weaknesses in the enemy, and aggressive enough to find or make opportunities to win. Fate controlled how the battle unfolded; Custer’s luck did not favor him this day.
General A. B. Nettleton, who served under Custer in the Civil War, said, “unlike many equally brave and skillful officers, he was rarely content to hold a position or drive his enemy; he always gathered the fruit, as well as shook the tree of battle.”1707
Give credit to both sides of this famous battle. The warriors fought well and earned an enormously important but nebulous victory. They won the battle but quickly lost the war because of it, as the citizens called for government to send a bigger army to defeat the Lakota and their allies. The soldiers were brave, too. They followed orders to go into Indian territory far from home to fight this declared enemy of the United States into submission.
General Sherman, one that knew George Custer well, made a statement to quiet the second-guessers that felt that, in the face of the huge village, Custer should not have attacked but instead relinquished the battlefield to Sitting Bull:
“Custer’s attack of the big Indian village was, under the circumstances and according to well-settled principles of Indian warfare neither rash nor desperate, because, having marched into the zone where the Indians were assembled, he could do nothing but attack when he found himself in the presence of the Indians.”1708
And
“From 500 to 800 warriors was the most the military authorities thought the hostiles could muster. Sitting Bull’s camp, as Custer found it, contained…, …. 2500 warriors, including boys, who were armed with bows and arrows…”1709
Later, General Nelson Miles wrote, “the real definition of ‘Custer’s luck’ was the judgment to do the right thing at the right time: being on the scene was certainly a prerequisite, but in and of itself did not guarantee results.”1706 No, it did not. Instead, you had to have a commander that was experienced, brilliant in exploiting weaknesses in the enemy, and aggressive enough to find or make opportunities to win. Fate controlled how the battle unfolded; Custer’s luck did not favor him this day.
General A. B. Nettleton, who served under Custer in the Civil War, said, “unlike many equally brave and skillful officers, he was rarely content to hold a position or drive his enemy; he always gathered the fruit, as well as shook the tree of battle.”
There have always been stories about a soldier or soldiers escaping. Those that made the claim have been discredited, except for possibly one soldier. The odds were against it happening, but it is possible that one man did escape. The account of Sergeant Frank Finkle is worth examining. John P. Koster, May 1, 2007, issue of the Wild West Magazine, wrote about a person who claimed he was Finkle and provided his story about how it happened. While it is quite a claim, it is disputed. You can read the complete story as published in The 7th U.S. Cavalry NEWS, first-team.us, History of the 7th Cavalry Regiment.
One Native American source that spoke of an unusual occurrence was Rain-in-the-Face (who may have returned to the village at the very end of the fighting or shortly afterwards). The warrior told W. Kent Thomas in 1894, “One long sword escaped. His pony ran off with him and went past our lodges [across from Calhoun Hill] … I remembered hearing the women talk about it after the fight.”
General Nelson Miles became the one that was given the task of punishing Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse and the other tribal leaders. He did exactly that and in a short time removed the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne tribes from their cherished free roaming days. It was the end of the era of the American Native Indian.
The Custer Debate divides mostly around Custer’s decision-making at the Little Bighorn: Was his decisions 1) decisive leadership versus 2) reckless?
“What If” Scenarios
The first scenario is what if The Regiment had taken along a battery of the Gatling guns. The main reason that Custer decided against taking the column’s rapid-firing Gatling gun on the march is they were a burden that would slow command down. They were pulled by condemned horses. The rough terrain they had to travel over would have depleted the remaining strength of the horses pulling them. The Custer battlefield was not practicable for the horse-drawn Gatlings.
On his Powder River – Tongue River scout, Major Reno brought the Gatling guns along. While the command was able to travel at good speed, they stopped often to let the rapid-fire weapons catch up. The gun battery tended to upset when traveling over rough terrain. At ravines, they had to be hauled over by hand. General Terry’s column struggled to bring them along, and it slowed their approach to the detriment of delaying Terry’s critical time of arrival. The Reno battlefield along the bottom might have been slightly more passable, but the rough country up Davis Creek, over the divide, down Reno [Ash] Creek, crossing the river, keeping up with the galloping cavalry, and being vulnerable to the counterattacking warriors all would have been of significant reason for Custer to not bring the Gattling battery along.
The warriors themselves knew not to attack directly at the Gatlings but would have approached stealthily and tried to pick off the operators, who had to operate out in the open. Lastly, Gatlings are not an offensive weapon, being too slow for Reno’s gallop down the valley toward the village. While they might have been useful at Reno Hill, they would not have survived the “Charge”-To-Reno Hill route. Custer would not have brought the artillery weapons with his battalions. If they were assigned to Reno and made it to the Timber, the Gatlings would have been unable to make it across the river and pulled up Reno Hill.
Even if they would have made it to Reno Hill, to operate them meant men would have been exposed to the heavy warrior fire. Warriors armed with long-range rifles would easily being able to pick off anyone manning the Gattling. These rapid-fire weapons had a short accuracy range, and the men manning them would not have survived.
The second scenario is what if Custer had accepted Major Brisbin’s offer to bring his 4 additional companies, or approximately 193 additional cavalrymen, from the Montana Column. There were over 60 men of the 7th Regiment that had to walk because the army could not supply enough horses for these men. The total of at least another 253 cavalrymen would have helped to some degree. The offer was made earlier when the commanders were on The Far West on the Yellowstone River. Estimated warrior count was far below what Custer actually found.
If the Montana 2nd Cavalry were available for Reno’s initial charge, it would have improved the chances of a successful charge into the village instead of halting short, if Major Reno chose to continue the charge. Or, if he chose to retreat into the Timber, Major Reno’s battalion and the command could have stayed in the Timber long enough, about 15 minutes longer, for Custer to capture the women and children. The failure of not having enough men in the army, or enough horses even for the number they did have, falls at the desks of those in Congress and army leaders.
Custer stated that he felt his Seventh Cavalry had sufficient manpower to handle the last reported numbers of hostiles, reported estimated at least 900, but no more than 1,500 warriors. It was not sufficient in size to deal with the 2,500–3,000 fighters they actually and unexpectedly met. The scouts knew of the warrior count and kept Custer informed as new converging trails of unexpected and substantial summer roamers joined Sitting Bull in the last couple of days.
According to James McLaughlin, Standing Rock Sioux Agency, who wrote My Friend The Indian, Gall, Crow King, and other participants felt there was not less than 2,500 warriors and about 10,000 total population. The 193 men of Major Brisbin’s battalion would have been helpful but still doubts remain if they would enough. It would depend on how they were deployed.
Instead of Captain Benteen, who responded to orders to “come quick” but did not, and dawdled an extra 5 or more minutes at the Morass and then came not at a trot or gallop, but at a “fast walk.” Not impressive. The captain was a rough officer and a great fighter. Benteen had no idea of the situation Custer was in, and his slow pace was as an antagonist instead of an ally. He certainly saw with his own eyes how the enemy trail continued to grow to large numbers.
At best effort, Benteen would have arrived at Reno Hill around 4:00 PM. His earliest arrival at Calhoun Hill at a gallop/trotting pace would be as early as 4:25 PM. Likely, he would have had to fight his way through warriors. His impact on the Custer fight is hard to know. Let us say his impact would have been minimal, though that does not excuse his actions.
While Reno was not well liked by his fellow cadets and Civil War officers, he was a good commander and well thought of by his commanding officers. The Major did not have Custer’s outgoing personality and did not inspire his men like Custer. He did not have Custer’s flair of charging larger enemy forces, but Reno did wield his forces professionally.1714
Reno’s decision, caused by the disturbing witnessing of Bloody’ Knife’s death, that led to leaving the reasonable protective area of the Timber to “charge” to Reno Hill caused his battalion to be separated and mauled by the warriors, making his battalion “hors de combat.” The possible scenario is that he could have defended the Timber, tying down the warriors during a critical time, thus would allow Custer time to capture the women and children and allow Keogh to defend his position against a significantly smaller warrior force.
The fact remains that the whole 7th Regiment supplemented with the 2nd Cavalry could have still been completely wiped out. The exception is tying the warriors for at least 15 minutes longer at the Timber.
The 3rd scenario is Custer keeping The 7th Cavalry together and attacking the village with the whole regiment. An attack down the valley with the whole 7th Cavalry would have caused the village to flee and warriors busy helping their families to find some place of safety. The challenge is that the village would have fled in all directions, and the 7th would have been hard-pressed to catch and defeat them for a victory.
When Reno stopped his charge, word spread in the village, and warriors began riding toward the Timber in increasing numbers. Reno had sufficient reason to halt the charge. If Reno had continued the charge, it was unlikely that he could have captured the Hunkpapa part of the village, unless the warriors decided to take their families to safety first, which is what was occurring at the time he halted. His command would have experienced heavy casualties, and the battalion could have been wiped out.
Even if the warriors gave ground to help their families flee to safety and the village fell into Custer’s hands, the eventual counterattack by warriors would have to be dealt with. If Benteen or Major Brisbin, Montana Column, or both had been part of Reno, it would have had an impact on the charge and increased the odds of capturing part of the village, but the occupants would have been fleeing and difficult to catch unless Custer could have ridden downriver and gotten behind the women and children.
McDougall and Lieutenant Mathey would have been able to bring up the packs and provide sufficient ammunition98F[1]. Victory would not be declared unless a number of women and children were captured. According to Custer’s own philosophy, “Luck favors the bold!”
The 4th scenario is that Major Reno stayed 15 minutes longer in the Timber. This action would have kept the warriors occupied, allowing General Custer the needed time to get his command of two battalions to reach, cross Ford D, and capture the women and children, leading to victory.
Captain Moylan, who was one of the few officers friendly with Reno, testified at the Reno Court of Inquiry, “I think the most judicious course was to leave the Timber, if possible. Had the command stayed there 30 minutes longer, I doubt if it would have gotten out with as many men as it did.”1715
Lieutenant Wallace was later asked about the likely casualties if the command had remained in the defensive position. He responded, “Major Reno and every man with him would have been killed.”1716
Lieutenant Hare said, “If we stayed there much longer we would be shut in so that we could not get out.”1717
It is not hard to understand why Wallace felt that way. The most likely outcome of staying longer in the Timber is that warriors would have been drawn off to fight Custer. Reno suffered almost 30 casualties, and despite quality officer beliefs, Native American accounts expressed surprise when the soldiers came out of the protection of the defensive site.
Like many of these scenarios, the answer depends on speculation that is controlled by numerous variables. The command had enough ammunition, if fire was controlled, to last an hour or two at the most. The terrain did not lend an advantage to the warriors to consolidate their fire and overwhelm Reno.
Custer had not supported the command in the manner that Reno had expected or wanted, but his actions to go to Ford B, then Ford D, would have relieved the pressure on the Timber if Reno had not retreated so soon. Warrior pressure would have been lessened had either Benteen, McDougall, or Mathey and the mule packs arrived at the Timber.
Under the circumstances, there is no blame for leaving the Timber. It was the commander’s choice. The decision to leave appears to be based on the Bloody Knife event. Reno gave confused orders and then rushed out of the protection of the Timber, what some warriors claimed was a good defensive position, losing 20–29 men in the rout retreat to the Reno Crossing and the climb up to Reno Hill.
Finally, Reno not taking immediate charge on Reno Hill, instead staying hidden for the most part and drinking to try to calm his nerves, were points of the Major’s mental state at the time. The next day, Reno seemed to have fully recovered and took command. While experts are mixed, there are those that do not find fault with his actions; many do.
The question that we will never have an answer to is how much longer he would have remained at the Timber if the Bloody Knife killing had not happened. Would Reno have stayed another 1 minute, 5 minutes, 10 minutes? The longer the command stayed, the more time Custer would have gained to complete his attack plans.
This extra time would have allowed Custer to capture women and children. It would have kept the warriors busy and reduced the pressure on Major Reno. Regardless, the odds were against Custer, but his past battles showed he was capable of winning victories when the odds were not heavily in his favor.
The 5th scenario is Captain Benteen coming quickly as ordered. At the Reno Court of Inquiry, Benteen testified that when he received the “be quick” message, which was addressed to him and indicated a need for a fast response, he referred to Trumpeter Private Martin’s excited comments to the men with Benteen that the Native Americans were “skedaddling.”
Benteen later stated that if the Indians were “skedaddling,” therefore there was less necessity for him going back for the packs. The captain was being coy, as he understood that the message was an order that meant to bring a couple of mules loaded with spare ammunition quickly, not the whole train. The mules with the spare ammunition were kept close to the front of the pack train.1718
As a seasoned veteran, Benteen knew that the ammunition was the highest priority. While the other officers testified that they heard firing coming from the downriver trail that Custer had traveled, Benteen stated he did not hear the firing. Either it was because his hearing was damaged by too much firing range work, or he did hear it but knew testifying that he did hear it would bring up questions about his tardiness.
The food and other supplies in the pack train were not needed to be brought along in a hurry. His easy pace was in stark contrast to “be quick.” It is important to note that if Benteen had followed his orders and arrived at Calhoun Hill in time with a fresh battalion of men and more ammunition, while it did not guarantee a changed outcome, it possibly could have changed the outcome.
There is little doubt that Captain Benteen clearly understood the message by thinking that Custer needed just two pack mules with ammunition and not the whole pack train when he read Trumpeter Martin’s written message addressed to Benteen. While he stated that he did not hear the firing, officers with him did so.
But there is no misunderstanding, according to Benteen’s own testimony, that messenger Martin stated that the Indians were skedaddling. He used the statement as one of his reasons why he did not rush forward.
As Benteen arrived at Reno Hill, he was asked, “Where is the pack train?” His response: “I did not go back to get it because Custer wanted me to come as fast as I could. But I sent the sergeant on, and he should have it along shortly.”
There are some contradictory comments, but that is not unusual either. Benteen allowed his hatred of Custer to interfere with his duty to follow orders. It allows Benteen’s battalion to reach Custer in time to impact the battle, and the battered Reno to come later and rejoin them99F[2]. Could Captain Benteen have arrived in time to increase the odds of victory to some degree?
Sergeant Kanipe delivered Custer’s verbal message to Benteen just before Lone Tipi at 3:42 PM. Trumpeter Martin met Captain Benteen at the Flats and delivered the written message at 3:58 PM.
Benteen joined Major Reno at Reno Hill at 4:20 PM. Benteen and his battalion arrived at Weir Point at 5:35 PM100F[3]. The time could have been covered at a trot, as Custer had traveled over the same trail. From Weir Point, it was only a matter of minutes to reach Calhoun Hill. The one hour it took Benteen to ride from the Morass and reach Weir Point, before quickly leaving for Captain Keogh at Calhoun Hill, was not what might be expected for an urgent and critical order. His attitude may have reflected an effort to “slow walk” the movement.
In comparison, Custer’s and Reno’s battalions passed the Morass at 1:30 PM and reached Cedar Coulee, in proximity to Weir Point, at 3:25 PM. If Captain Benteen had a hatred for Custer, he did not necessarily “slow walk” his movement after receiving the order to “come quick.” Instead, he advanced at a reasonable, but not an expedient, pace to Reno Hill.
The sixth scenario moves from a small chance of victory to perhaps the best chance of victory for Custer and all the campaign commanders. The Battle of the Rosebud had been fought six days prior. Chief Crazy Horse led warriors from the village that was located slightly farther up the Little Bighorn River. The number of warriors was smaller than those present at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, as summer roamers were still attempting to catch up with Sitting Bull’s camp.
General Crook would not have yielded the battlefield101F[4]. This was not in his nature as the commander who had defeated the mighty Geronimo and the Apache and Snake nations [the name Americans gave for the Northern Paiute, Bannock, and Western Shoshone bands]. While he had a tough fight against Crazy Horse, Lakota, and the Northern Cheyenne at the Battle of the Rosebud, he left the battlefield at the end of the day with fewer casualties than the Lakota. This was the greatest victory that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne would experience leading up to the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The Native Americans lost more fighters than Crook’s army column did.
Crook, with about twice as many soldiers as Custer, fought almost a week later. Crazy Horse had far fewer warriors against Crook, and the general had a substantial fighting force remaining and enough provisions to continue the attack. His 300 experienced Native Army scouts included a large contingent of the best fighters — Crow, as well as Northern Paiute, Bannock, and Western Shoshone. They were their ancient enemies and had the most experience fighting the Americans and knowledge of the land in this area, which used to be their territory until the large Lakota tribes pushed them out.
General Sheridan planned that Crook, Terry, and Gibbon would operate independently of each other, but with the idea to push the Native Americans into the middle of all three groups and attack from three sides. Their combined forces totaled over 2,400 soldiers and Native Army scouts. This sizable force could have been sufficient to win, assuming the Lakota would stay and fight instead of breaking up into small groups and fleeing in the face of a strong enemy. Even with the combined army forces, the battle would not have been an easy victory if the Lakota decided to fight.
It is likely that once the Lakota and the Cheyenne discovered that they had two army groups of over 2,400 soldiers and scouts, the village would have fled in the safest direction and fought a delaying battle so the non-combatants could escape. However, this scenario has the best odds of victory.
The 7th scenario, Custer would have crossed Ford B with both Yates and Keogh and entered the village, capturing remaining women and children who had not fled away from danger. It was a tenuous option because his force would have been in the middle of the village and subject to heavy attack from three sides without any cover to fight from. It was likely that the remaining number of non-combatants was small. Villagers were used to quickly gathering the children and basics, then rapidly moving away from danger.
This may have been the most critical decision that Custer had to make along the timeline. The village was just feet away from Yates’ battalion. The village was only tipis and the items they held. There was little value in capturing articles and items of the village. Capturing a village occupant’s tipis, clothing, food, items, weapons, ammunition, and ponies by itself was not victory, as some items could be replaced, but many items could not easily be replaced. Yates would have been vulnerable to attack from three directions, with a river crossing blocking his only escape direction.
[1] History’s victory and losses abound with stories of the more military advanced side losing when they ran short of ammunition. In 1879, 1,800 British soldiers armed with gunpowder Martini-Henry breechloading rifles and 2 field guns were surprised by 20,000 Zulu warriors armed mostly with assegai iron spears and cow-hide shields at Isandhlwana in Africa. The British held fast until they ran low on ammunition because it remained in wooden boxes that was brought by ship. The boxes needed to be unscrewed to open and used, but screwdrivers were scarce. No one thought to open extra boxes before the fighting began. Once the soldiers ran out of cartridges, they only had bayonets as a weapon. The most skilled warrior of the time using a spear were the Zulus, who were able to overwhelm the soldiers with skill and experience in fighting with the assegai, plus sheer overwhelming numbers. The Lakota warriors stated the Custer fight started, and the fighting was light, but was later tougher with little headway until later. It was a combination of more warriors arriving after seeing loved ones to safety, and a depletion of the battalion’s ammunition that led to overpowering the individual battalions. Benteen was ordered to bring ammunition, he did not.
[2] Captain Benteen made the following after the battle statement, “I am not read to subscribe to any effort of the public’s opinion to convince me that Custer was a great man or great warrior…. I’m only too proud to say that I despised him.” Possibly in the face of being on the wrong side of tremendous public admiration, Benteen added, “Cadets for ages to come will bow in humility at the Custer shrine at West Point; and if it makes better soldiers & men of them, why the necessity of knocking the paste eye out of their idol?”
[3] (John S. Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p 320, Table 11 and many other Tables; Vern Smalley, Little Bighorn Mysteries, Chapter 26, p 1-26, Chapter 29, p 1-12: Little Big Horn Association, most extensive time chronology of the June 25 day, (Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 19, 2022.)
[4] Custer’s strategic winter attack plan that he developed was successfully implemented at Black Kettle’s camp with snow on the ground. The tribes were dispersed and weak from lack of food. Their horses were weak from lack of grass. If Custer was ordered to attack the hostiles at the close of winter, which was May in 1876, with just the 7th Cavalry and not General Crook and General Terry, it would have provided a greater opportunity for a victory over Sitting Bull. Crazy Horse had not joined Sitting Bull and had been already attacked, so he would be unlikely to aid the Hunkpapa’s. With a village reportedly between 1,000 – 3,000 people and about 1,000 or more warriors, the 7th was strong enough to win. It was Generals Sherman and Sheridan’s desire to mount a full campaign that could not begin until the end of May that allowed time for the snow to melt and the village to grow stronger with Summer Roamers joining them to a point that the 7th Cavalry alone was insufficient to win. General Crook fought his own, uncoordinated battle against a small warrior force under Crazy Horse, that the general lost when he evacuated out of the area. General Terry was with Custer, but his delays enroute caused his column to arrive a day after the battle. His small column of 400 men may not have made any difference as the village had grown to at least 10,000 occupants. The faced with this additional force on its flank would have caused the Great Council confusion and concern. But Custer was never given the Terry Column’s blocking force opportunity. Military leaders decided to go with the significantly larger “3 Column” strategy, which had the typical delays and lack of coordination in the fog of war typical of fighting a campaign in hostile territory far from resources.
“Forty Years ago I fought Custer till all were dead. I was then the enemy of the Whitemen. Now I am the friend and brother, living in peace together under the flag of our country.” -Two Moons, Northern Cheyenne